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EVADING THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AcT:
STATE STRATEGIES AND FEDERAL COMPLICITY
Evan Stephenson •

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Education (Education Department) has the
legal duty to implement the three-part vision of the No Child Left Behind
1
Act (NCLB or the Act). Under NCLB, all public school students must
progress toward I 00 percent proficiency in math and reading within a
2
twelve-year period ending in 2014. Student proficiency is to be
3
determined bX uniform statewide tests.
These tests must be
"challenging," meaning that they align with state educational
5
standards. Second, NCLB requires that student test improvement must
6
progress evenly over time. Third and finally, NCLB ensures that
disadvantaged students may not be left behind under the Act's
7
accountability mandates. In this respect, racial and ethnic minorities,
limited English speakers, the poor, and disabled students must progress
as the overall general students. To ensure that these student subgroups

' Law Clerk, Hon. John M. Rogers, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2005-06.
J.D., Univ. of Va., 2005. I would like to thank Terri Schwartzbeck, Jared Jacobs, Jeff Bennion,
Tristen Stephenson, Brent Olson, Ed Stephenson, Jared Berg, Yvonne Stephenson, and Professor
Charles J. Goetz for their insightful comments. Thank you also to Professor Jim Ryan, who oversaw
and inspired this piece.
I. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. 2002); see Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council,
Inc., 46 7 U.S. 837, 842 ( 1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.").
2. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(l )(A)-( B) (requiring that all students be included in the state
accountability system); id. at§ 6311(b)(I)(F), (b)(I)(G)(iv), (b)(3)(A). See also Rod Paige, Key

Policy

Letters

Signed

hy

the

!Oducation

Secretary

or

Deputy

Secretary,

http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/ secletter/020724.html (July 24, 2002).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(3)(A), (C).
4. !d. at§§ 6301, 6311(b)(I)(A).
5. !d. at§ 6311(b)(1 )(D)(ii).
6. !d. at § 63ll(b)(2)(H)(i) (providing that intermediate goals tor meeting NCLB's
requirements shall "increase in equal increments over the period covered by the State's timeline").
7. !d. at§ 6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(l), (ll)(aa)-(dd); 34 C.F.R. § 200.13.
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8

keep pace, states must track their subgroups' test results separately.
Notwithstanding its duty to implement this three-part vision, the
Education Department has approved three devices that can each be used
to evade a part of the Act's aims. These devices allow states to inflate
their student proficiency statistics, thereby minimizing the likelihood of
falling subject to the Act's harsh sanctions for inadequate test
9
performance. Furthermore, these devices lessen states' incentives to
accomplish the same ends by allowing them to use the (more harmful)
10
alternative of lowering educational standards.
The first device allows states to evade NCLB's vision of evenly
distributed progress over time by "backloading" their planned student
11
This device, or Balloon Schedule, named for its
proficiency gains.
similarity to "balloon mortgage" repayment schedules in which payments
12
swe\\ (\.e., ba\\oon) \n tne \ater )'Cars, a\\ows a state to scne<.\u\e tne
majority of student P.roflciency gains for the second half of NCLB's
13
twelve-year timeline.
For example, Wyoming, Georgia, and thirteen
other states have scheduled two-thirds of all student proficiency gains in
14
the last four years of the twelve-year timeline. Seven other states have
15
scheduled the majority of such gains for the latter half of the timeline.
The second device can be used by states to evade NCLB's
mechanism for watching over disadvantaged subgroups. The Education
Department permits states to exclude selected schools' subgroups from
their statistical reports by electing to raise the minimum number of
students that must belong to a subgroup in each school before it is
tracked for accountability purposes (referred to below as selection of
16
minimum subgroup sizes). For instance, Missouri's minimum subgroup
17
size for racial and ethnic minorities is thirty. Thus, a Missouri school

8. !d.

9.

S~:e

injra sec. ll.A-II.D.

I 0. See inji·a sec. III.

II. See infra sec. !.C.-J.D.

12. A backloaded increase structure is "not unlike a balloon mortgage, leaving the heaviest
lifting to those who will be in office long after the designers of that state's plan have departed the
scene." Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Frederick M. Hess, On Leaving No Child Hehind, 157 Pub. Interest
35, 43 (Fall 2004 ).
13. This definition is adapted from the Education Department's own description of the
strategy. S~:e U.S. Dept. Educ., infra n. 56 (noting that "Alaska and a number of other states,
including Ohio and Arizona, created a trajectory that is more aggressive in the second half' of the
timeline).
14. See infi·a tbl. 1 (derived from U.S. Dept. Educ., Approved State Accountahilitv Plans,
http:// www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/index.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2006)).
15. S~:~: infra tbl. I.
16. See infra sec. I.F.I.
17. D. Kent King, Missouri Consolidated Stale Application Accountahililv Workbook 28,
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with twenty-nine or fewer minority students will not be required to
separately account for these students' test performance. Under some
circumstances, perhaps that choice could be justifiable. Suppose,
hypothetically, that Missouri wanted to strategically exclude certain
special education subgroups from its statistical accountability reports.
Missouri could do so by merely raising the minimum subgroup size for
disabled students high enough that few schools would have enough
disabled students to trigger separate reporting. For whatever reasons,
Missouri has set a relatively high minimum subgroup size of fifty for the
18
disabled.
The third and final device allows states to avoid the Act's chief aim
19
of 100 percent proficiency.
States can escape the 100 percent
proficienczb goal by calculating their statistics using confidence
intervals. A confidence interval is a statistical device that defines a
21
"margin of error. " Schools may be considered NCLB-compliant when
22
they reach state proficiency goals minus the margin of error.
Hypothetically, if a state's proficiency goal is 100 percent and its margin
of error is eight percent, the state's schools may be considered compliant
if they reach only ninety-two percent student proficiency. With such
cushioning of their statistics, schools may never have to reach 100
percent proficiency, or any goal leading there.
This article examines the possible motives of states and the federal
government in crafting these devices, their legality, and their probable
effects on educational standards. Ultimately, this article furnishes
evidence that pressure from NCLB to rapidly achieve 100 percent
student proficiency encourages states to lower their educational
standards, and that the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum
subgroup sizes, and confidence intervals have the benefit of releasing
states from some of this pressure that was arguably intended by the Act.
Part I offers background on NCLB and its goals, and examines in
detail three devices that states have used to evade the Act, with particular
emphasis on the Balloon Schedule. Part II shows that states have adopted
these devices to minimize their schools' exposure to NCLB's harsh
sanctions for inadequate test performance. Part II further argues that the
Education Department has approved the use of these devices in part to
save the Act from its own unrealistic requirements and probably also as a
http:// www.cd.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/mocsa.pdf (updated July 5, 2005).
18.

/d.

19. See infi·a sec. I.F.2.
20. !d.
21. !d.
22. !d.
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means of preventing NCLB from being considered a failure. Part lii
demonstrates that the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum subgroup
sizes, and the use of confidence intervals, though at odds with NCLB's
vision, reduce the pressure on states to define proficiency down by
lowering their educational standards. To this extent, these devices are
good for educational standards in America.
I. THE BALLOON SCHEDULE AND OTHER DEVICES:
DEFINITIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

A. NCLB 's Time line for 100 Percent Student Proficiency
in Math and Reading
In January 2002, President George W. Bush announced that as a
23
result of the newly-passed No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
"America's schools will be on a new path of reform, and a new path of
24
results." These new results are supposed to include an increase in the
level of student academic achievement and elimination of the
25
In
"achievement gap" between children of various backgrounds.
crafting NCLB, lawmakers assumed that every child could score
26
proficiently on tests and that a key to student success is setting high
.
27
expectatiOns.

23. 20 U.S.C. ~~6301-7941.
24. Andrew Rudalevigc, The Politics of No Child /.efi Behind, 3 Educ. Next 62, 63 (Fall
2003) (available at http://www.educationncxt.org/20034/pdf/62.pdf).
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 630 I (Statement of Purpose); 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(a)( I )--(2) (emphasizing
the necessity of meeting academic standards and closing the achievement gap); Alex Duran, Factors
to Consider When Evaluating School Accountability Results, 34 J.L. & Educ. 73, 74 (2005); James
E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Lefi Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 932
(2004).
26. See George W. Bush, The Essential Work of1Jemocracv, 86 Phi Delta Kappan 114 (Oct.
2004) ("These reforms were entitled No Child Left Behind (NCLB) to rctlect my belief that every
child can learn. When expectations are high, America's children will rise to meet them."): George
W. Bush, Speech, Remarks to the National Urban League Confi'rence (Oct., Mich., July 23, 2004),
in 40 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 1365 (July 26, 2004) ("The philosophy of the No Child Left Behind
Act says every child can learn. (W]c expect every child to learn and we expect you to show us
whether or not every child is learning."); Michael Dobbs, Former Math Teacher Recalculates No
Child Leji Behind Initiative, Wash. Post Al9 (Mar. 16, 2004) (quoting Assistant Education Secretary
Raymond Simon saying the "only thing that is intlcxible about [NCL13] is the idea that every child is
capable of learning").
27. See Bush, The Essential Work of D<'mocracv, supra n. 26; George W. 13ush. Speech,
Remarks hy the President in "'Ask President Bush .. F. vent (Fond Du Lac, Wis., July 14, 2004), in
White House Press Releases and Documents (available at 2004 WLNR 2541352) [hereinafter Bush,
Remarks]; Jay Matthews, To Educators, "No Child Goals Out of Reach .. Wash. Post A 12 (Sept. 16,
2003) (quoting former U.S. Education Secretary Rod R. Paige).
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NCLB ambitiously orders states to ensure that all students in affected
schools test proficiently (with proficiency defined by each state) in math
28
and reading within twelve years or by the school year ending in 2014.
Accordingly, every state has submitted an accountability workbook to
the Education Department, delineating a schedule of the state's student
29
proficiency goals for specific years. The Department has provisionally
30
approved all of these workbooks.
NCLB requires states to set one annual measurable objective (AMO)
applicable to each school, consisting of a percentage of students who
31
must test proficiently.
AMOs are a component of adequate yearly
progress (A YP), a phrase signifying whether a school meets all of
32
NCLB's annual student improvement requirements.
For example,
Virginia's plan requires seventy percent (the AMO) of its middle school
students to test proficiently in reading on state tests in 2005, 2006, and
33
2007.
Seventy percent is thus a Virginia AMO for those years. If,
hypothetically, only sixty-nine percent of students in a Virginia middle
school test proficiently in 2007, then that school would fail to achieve
this AMO and would also fail to make A YP for that year.
The AMO must also be independently achieved by the following
four student subgroups in each school: the economically disadvantaged,
limited English proficiency speakers, "major" racial or ethnic minorities,
34
and the disabled. If a school as a whole or any of its subgroups fails to
35
achieve the AMO, the whole school fails to make A YP that year.

28. 20 U.S.C. 9 63ll(b)(I)(A)-(B) (requiring that all students be included in the state
accountability system); !d. at 9 63ll(b)( I )(F), (b)(l )(G)(iv), (b)(3)(A).
29. See infra n. 50 and accompanying text.
30. The Education Department provisionally approved all 50 state plans, including those
laying out the Balloon Schedule. See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Press Releases: President Bush, Secretary
Paige Celebrate Approval of Every State Accountability Plan under No Child Left Behind, http://
www.ed.gov/news/prcssrelcases/2003/06/06102003.html (June 10, 2003); William J. Erpenbach et
at., Statewide Educational Accountabili(v under No Child Lefi Behind 3 (Council of Chief St. Sch.
Officers 2003) (available at http://www.ccsso.org/publications/details.cfm?PublicationiD=215;
select Download Free PDF(s) now) (observing that all the states' plans have been provisionally
approved).
31. NCLB commands states to establish "statewide annual measurable objectives" towards
total proficiency by 2014.20 U.S.C. 9 63ll(b)(2)(G). These must be the "same for all schools and
local education agencies in the state." 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(G)(ii). They also must consist of a
"single minimum percentage of students" who must score proficiently. 20 U.S.C. §
63ll(b)(2)(G)(iii). See also 34 C.F.R. § 200.18.
32. See 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(B) (C) (setting forth the definition of "adequate yearly
progress"); 34 C.F.R. § 200.14.
33. See inji·a tbl. I.
34. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(C)(v)(l), (ll)(aa)-(dd); 34 C.F.R. § 200.13.
35. 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(C). This is true unless the Act's safe harbor provision applies,
which is unimportant for this discussion. See 20 U.S.C. § 631l(b)(2)(1)(i) (safe harbor provision).
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Hypothetically, if in 2007 only sixty-nine percent of a Virginia middle
school's special education (i.e., disabled) students test proficiently in
reading, then that school would fail to make A YP for that year-even if
36
every other student in the school scored proficiently.
As guidance for setting AMOs, the Act requires states to choose a
"starting point" based on either the proficiency rate of the state's lowest
performing subgroup or the proficiency rate of the school ranked at the
37
state's twentieth percentile in student proficiency.
The difference
between the starting point and l 00 percent comprises the total percentage
38
in student proficiency to be gained.
States must also determine the
39
school years in which the percent proficient will increase. Goals for
40
increased proficiency are "intermediate goals." NCLB mandates that
"[ e]ach State shall establish intermediate goals for meeting the
requirements, including measurable objectives ... that shall increase in
41
equal increments over the period covered by the State's timeline." The
first such increase must occur no later than 2005, with later increases
42
delayed no longer than three years. Of course, AMOs and intermediate
goals must place every school on a path toward I 00 percent student
proficiency by 2014.
B. "Continuous and Substantial" Student Progress Forbids the Balloon
Schedule

NCLB requires student improvement to be evenly distributed over
time. The Act and regulations repeatedlj emphasize that student progress
4
must be "continuous and substantia/," reflecting Congress's intent that
states' timelines distribute proficiency gains evenly and not backload
them. The intermediate goals of Arkansas and South Carolina for middle
school reading are good examples of evenly scheduled proficiency

36. See e.g. Mark Goldberg, Test Mess 2: Are We Doing Better a Year Luter~, 86 Phi Delta
Kappan 389 (Jan. 2005) ("In North Carolina, more than 90'% of schools arc meeting the state growth
goals, but only 47"/c, of schools made A YP. Of those that failed, 283 missed the federal goal because
one subgroup fell below its proficiency level.").
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 63ll(b)(2)(E) ("Each State, using data for the 2001~2002 school year,
shall establish the starting point for measuring, under subparagraphs (G) and (H), the percentage of
students meeting or exceeding the State's proficient level of academic achievement on the State
assessments under paragraph (3) and pursuant to the timeline described in subparagraph (F)."). See
also id. at§ 631l(b)(2)(E)(i)~(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 200.16.
38. See supra nn. 32~37 and accompanying text.
39. See it?fra nn. 40-41, 46~47 and accompanying text.
40. 20 U.S.C. § 631I(b)(2)(H).
41. !d.
42. See id.
43. See 20 U.S. C.§ 63ll(b)(2)(C)(iii), (b)(2)(C)(v); 34 C.F.R. 200.13(b)(3).

growth.
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Figure l: Straight-Line and Stair-Step Schedules
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Arkansas Mid-School Reading Goals from Table I
So. Carolina Mid-School Reading Goals from Table I i

Arkansas uses an annually increasing straight-line schedule, and South
45
Both schedules
Carolina opts for tri-annually increasing stair-steps.
have trend lines that share the same slope and both distribute gains
evenly over the timeline's first and second halves.
To specifically forbid the Balloon Schedule, Congress included
language in the Act that limits states' flexibility in setting intermediate
goals. AlthouRh states may schedule such goals annually, bi-annually, or
4
such goals must facilitate progress "over the period
tri-annually,
47
covered by the State's timeline" in "equal increments." One state's
2003 NCLB workbook acknowledges that this statutory language
expresses Congress's intent to forbid backloading of proficiency
increases: "The Congressional intention [in] using [the 'equal
increments'] language was to ensure that no State waited until near the
end (~{the timeline and then expected enormous, unrealistic growth in the
48
last two or three years. " "Continuous and substantial" improvement
facilitated by "equal" intermediate goals over the timeline, therefore,
refers to even distribution of proficiency gains and prohibits the Balloon
Schedule.

44. Infra tbl. I .
45. Arkansas and South Carolina have the same starting point (eighteen percent) for
intermediate/middle school reading. See infra tbl. I.
46. See 20 U.S.C. ~ 6311(b)(2)(H).
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(H)(i).
4g. See Ill. St. Bd. Educ., Accountahilitv Workhook Originally Adopted in June 2003 9, http://
www.ed.gov/admins/lcad/account/statcplans03/ilcsa.pdf(revised Aug. 23, 2005) (emphasis added).
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C. Many States Have Adopted the Balloon Schedule

Instead of evenly distributing their proficiency gains as required by
49
the Act, many states have backloaded student proficiency increases.
Table I on the next page shows the states' AMOs and intermediate goals
for intermediate/middle school reading, as contained in the states' 2003
50
accountability workbooks.
Table I identifies, by italics, the many
states that have arguably used the Balloon Schedule in their 2003
accountability workbooks. Five plans lacked sufficient AMO information
for inclusion in the table. Of the forty-five remaining plans, twenty-two
evidence the Balloon Schedule.

49. See supra sec. I. B.
50. Table I compiles data from the fifty states' 2003 approved accountability workbooks as
posted on the Education Department website. See U.S. Dept. Educ., Approved State Accountability
Plans, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/index.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2006).
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Table 1: 2003 State Accountability Workbooks
Intermediate/Middle School Readin£ Proficiency Goals and Increases

02-start

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Alabama*
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware*
Florida
Geor!!ia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana*
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland*
Mass.
Michigan
Minnesota
M ississiQQi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hamp.
New Jersey
New Mexico*
New York*
N. Carolina
N. Dakota
Ohio*
Oklahoma
Oregon*
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
S. Carolina
S. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont*
Virginia
Washinpton
W. Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyominv

-64
31
18
14
75
62

Year, 0/o Proficient
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
64
31
25
14
75
62

64
31
32
14
75
62

76
54
59
35
87
72 72 72 81

70
43
39
24
81

-31
NA
30
40
-61
51
46
'?
35

X

61
37
60
58
--

-69
61

70
43
52
24
81
X

31 31 48 48 48
60 60 67 67 67
30 30 44 44 44
Not Enough
40 40 48 48 55
61
51
46
37
35

61
51
46
37
35

68
63
51
47
42

X

76
31
70
30

X

X

X

X

76
54
66
46
87
81

76
54
73
57
87
81

82
66
80
68
94
91

88
77
86
78
94
91

94
89
93
89
94
91

100
100
100
100
100
100

X

X

X

X

X

68
63
56
47
42

68
63
62
47
42

81
43
76
48

81
43
79
48

100
100
100

85 93 93

100

X

X

X

X

74
76
78
58
67

81
88
84
68
75

87
88
89
79
83

94
88
95
89
92

100
100
100
100
100

85 85 90
54 54 54
82 85 88
65 65 65
59
Information
81 81 81
58 58 69
80 80 80
76 76 76

90
66
91
83
80

95
77
94
83

95
89
97
83

100
100
100
100
100

91
69
90
87

91
79
90
87

91
90
90
87

100
100
100
100
X

74
76
67
58
50

74
76
73
58
58

X

Enough
71 71
48 48
70 70
66 66

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

69 69 77 77 77 84 84 84 92 92 92
61 61 71 71 71 81 81 81 90 90 90

--

X

82 82 82
80 87 93
72 72 86

X

X

76
43
73
48
39
Not
61 61 71
37 37 48
60 60 70
58 58 66
71
31
70
30

X

65 65 65
73 73 73
58 58 58
Information
63 70 78

X

--

71
31
70
30
18

70
43
45
24
81

14

12 13

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

100
100
X

Not Enough Information

-45
68
18
65
47
65
-61
30
61
35

X

45
68
18
65

45
68
18
65

54 54 54
73 73 73
38 38 38
71 71 71
Not Enouvh
47 47 54 54 60
65 65 71 71 77
X

61 61 70 70 70
36 42 48 53 59
Not Enough
I 61 61 68 68 68
35 35 45 45 45

X

63 63 63
79 79 79
59 59 59
77 77 77
Information
60 67 73
77 83 83
X

80 80 80
65 71 77
Information
74 74 74
56 56 56

X

72 81

91
84 89 95
79 79 79
83 88 94

100
100
100
100

80 87 93
89 89 95

100
100

X

X

90 90 90
83 88 94

100
100

81 87 94
67 78 89

100
100

*This state initial_lydcsivnatcd the years for improvement (n1arkcd as "x") without exact -,-oals.
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For example, from 2003 to 2008-the first half of the Act's
timeline-Georgia expects its middle-school reading proficiency rate in
each school to increase from sixty percent to seventy-three percent, a
thirteen percent jump. But from 2009 to 2014-the timeline's second
half-Georgia anticipates a much bigger increase from seventy-three
percent to one hundred percent, a twenty-seven percent leap. Although
51
Georgia's six intermediate goals are all about seven percent and are
thus equal to each other, only two are scheduled for the first half of the
52
timeline, while four are scheduled for the second half. Rather than
distributing its proficiency gains evenly over time, Georgia has
scheduled about twice as much growth for the timeline's final half, and
has therefore backloaded its gains by timing intermediate goals unevenly.
Figure 2 on the followin~ page illustrates the Balloon Schedule as
3
used by Wyoming and Maine.

51. The total amount of Georgia's combined proficiency increases-forty percent (i.e., the
I00 percent final goal minus the sixty percent starting point)~-divided by six (the number of
intermediate goals selected by Georgia) equals six and two-thirds. Georgia rounded up to seven
percent f()r all of its intermediate goals except the two scheduled for 2008 and 2013, which are six
percent. Thus. four goals of seven percent (twenty-eight percent), plus two goals of six percent
(twelve percent) equal forty percent. Supra tbl. I.
52. Supra tbl. I.
53. Wyoming and Maine share the same starting point (thirty-five percent) for intermediate/
middle school reading. !d. Figure 2 illustrates data displayed in Table I.
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Figure 2: Example Versions of the Balloon Schedule
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Wyoming Mid-School Reading Goals from Table I
Maine Mid-School Reading Goals from Table 1

Wyoming's and Maine's proficiency goals, like those of Georgia,
also employ the Balloon Schedule, putting the majority of the desired
growth in the second half of the timeline. Wyoming's plan sets six equal
intermediate goals for 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Maine's
schedule similarly opts for eight equal intermediate goals with most
scheduled at the timeline's end. These and any other such versions ofthe
Balloon Schedule run contrary to the "continuous and substantial" and
54
"equal increments" provisions of NCLB.

D. How States Obtained Approval for the Balloon Schedule:
The Education Department's Misreading of NCLB
Despite the Act's clarity in forbidding the Balloon Schedule, the
55
Education Department has allowed states to use it.
How has the
Department justified doing so? Quite simply, the Department approved
the Balloon Schedule by misinterpreting the clear "equal increments"
statutory language analyzed above. An Education Department press
release states "[ w ]bile states have to ensure that their intermediate goals
increase in equal increments over the NCLB timeline, states have great

54. See supra sec. I. B.
55. See supra n. 30 and accompanying text.
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flexibility in determining how often their intermediate goals increase.
States can raise their intermediate goals every year or every two or three
56
years."
The key phrase in this press release is "how often." In the
Department's view, states may backload proficiency gains, so long as
their intermediate goals are quantitatively equal to each other. Increases
may each equal ten percent, or 15 percent, or some other number. But
states can backload gains by selecting how often such increases occur.
57
Georgia, Wyoming, and Maine, as described above, have each planned
most of their equal increases for the timeline's second halrg -which has
the same effect as timing all increases consistently and making later
increases larger. Interestingly, the Education Department's interpretation
of the Act would not allow states to make later increases larger than
earlier increases, but it does allow the functional equivalent of doing so
by letting states plan a larger number of equal increases in later phases of
the schedule. The Department does not read the phrase "over the NCLB
timeline" to mean that increases should be equal over time and therefore
does not regulate the timing or rate of progress. This places few, if any,
constraints on when equal increases may take place, because it has
allowed backloading. The Education Department's view then arguably
contravenes NCLB's provisions. As such, the Balloon Schedule is
inconsistent with any plausible interpretation of "continuous and
59
substantial" progress in "equal increments" over time.
E. Did Congress Allow For an Accelerated Growth Interpretation of'
NCLB?

Some Balloon Schedules state claims in their accountability
workbooks that student proficiency will accelerate in later years, "after
teachers are given time to align their instruction with academic content
standards, after districts are given the opportunity to increase their
capacity to support needed reforms, and after there is a highly qualified
60
teacher in every ... classroom." Michigan anticipates acceleration in
56. U.S. Dept. Educ., Charting the Course States Decide Major Prm·isions under No Child
Lefi Behind, http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2004/0 I/0 1142004.html#elemcnts (Jan. 14,
2004) (emphasis added). This same section of the press release pointed to some balloon strategies to
show NCLB's "flexibility." !d.
57. See supra sec. I. C.
58. See supra tbl. I.
59. See supra sec. I. B.
60. See Cal. Dept. Educ., State of CalijiJrnia Consolidated S'tate llpplimtion llccountahility
Workbook 30, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lcad/account/stateplans03/cacsa.pdf (amended Aug. 23,
2005); see also Peter McWalters, Rhode [,fond f)<'partment of' h'ducation Consolidated State
Application Accountahi/ity Workhook 30, http://www.cd.gov/admins/lcad/account/stateplans03/
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proficiency for these reasons and because it expects educational norms to
change: "These shared norms and expectations require a significant
investment in the knowledge and skills of teachers in low-performing
schools and school districts before the most substantial improvement
61
gains will be realized."
Some education research can be stretched to support the notion that
schools' proficiency ~rowth can accelerate in the later years of an
2
accountability system.
Teacher and school quality both exert some
63
influence on student performance. Thus, if these variables improve at
64
an accelerated rate, as some Balloon Schedule states claim they will,
then it would be reasonable to expect student performance also to
65
In these circumstances, back loading may be theoretically
accelerate.
sound. Nevertheless, this theory of accelerated proficiency growth, even
if accepted, is simply not allowed by the Act's language, nor should it be
unquestioningly accepted on its own merits.
As discussed above, Congressional intent is reflected in the Act's
66
language, which prohibits backloading.
The Senate conference
members who explained the final version of NCLB to the Senate in
December 2001 disparaged backloading as both prohibited by the Act
and as unrealistic. When Senator Joseph Lieberman explained what the
"conferees intend" regarding "this system of setting [the] progress bar
and raising it in equal increments over a 12-year period," he spelled out
that "[i]t will further ensure that state plans outline realistic timelines for
ricsa.pdf (revised July 2004 ).
61. Mich. Dept. Educ., Michigan Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook
28, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplans03/micsa.pdf (amended June 2005).
62. Se<' g<'nerallv Harold Wenglinsky, How Schools Matter: The Link between Teacher
Classroom Practices and Stud!'nt Academic PerfiJrmance, 10 Educ. Policy Analysis Archives 12
(Feb. 13, 2002), http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v I On 12/ (The abstract of the article observes that "the
effects of classroom practices, when added to those of other teacher characteristics, are comparable
in size to those of student background, suggesting that teachers can contribute as much to student
learning as the students themselves."). Therefi)fe, if California, Rhode Island, and Michigan arc
correct that their overall school quality improvement (and related factors) will accelerate over time,
see supra nn. 60-61 and accompanying text, student performance could conceivably accelerate also.
See genaallv Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of'
State Policv Eo' vidence, 8 Educ.
Policy Analysis Archives
I (Jan.
I, 2000),
http://cpaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8nl/; Dan Goldhaber, The Mvsterv of' Good Teaching, 2 Educ. Next 50,52
(2002) (available at http://www.cducationnext.org/20021 /50.html) (finding that "high quality
teachers raise student performance" and that teacher characteristics alone account for 8.5 percent of
the variation in student achievement); Larry E. Suter, Is Student Achievement Immutable? Evidence
.fYom fnternalional Siudil's on Schooling and Student Achievement, 70 Rev. Educ. Research 529
(2000).
63. S"" id.
64. See e.g. supra nn. 60 61 and accompanying text.
65. Se<' supra nn. 60-62 and accompanying text.
66. See supra sec. 1.13.
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getting to proficiency, and prohibits states from 'backloading' their
67
expected proficiency gains in the out years." This statement suggests
the Senate conference members, therefore, did not consider backloading
to be "realistic." In fact, the Congressional Record publishes no
68
legislator's views to the contrary. Congress intended to forbid plans
based on accelerated proficiency growth.
Second, this accelerated growth justification for the BaBoon
Schedule should not be unquestioningly accepted on its own merits. The
education literature that can be stretched to support this acceleration
theory at best bolsters the Balloon Schedule's legitimacy only indirectly,
69
if at all. It is not clear, for instance, why accumulated improvements in
school quality, teacher quality, curriculum alignment with content
standards, and educational norms would accelerate rather than increase at
70
a constant, linear rate.
Even if some schools could accelerate
performance results, research by noted education scholar Richard
Rothstein suggests that solutions to rapidly accelerated performance
71
results are not generally applicable to all schools.

F. Other Evasion Devices
1. Selection of Minimum Subgroup Sizes
States have used other devices in addition to the BaBoon Schedule to
improve their NCLB statistics, including the selection of minimum
subgroup sizes. More than a dozen states have excluded disadvantaged
student subgroups from their accountability reports by raising the
minimum number of students that must be in a subgroup before it is
72
tracked for accountability purposes. For example, one Maryland school
67. 147 Cong. Rec. Sl3403 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen. Lieberman)
(emphasis added).
68. See id.
69. For examples of this literature, see supra n. 62 and accompanying text.
70. Although the literature cited supra in note 62 supports the notion that teacher and school
quality affect student learning, they do not specifically state that student learning or teacher and
school quality have any tendency (or capability) to improve at an accelerated rate. The claim that
any of these can improve at an accelerated rate is derived not from the scholarly literature cited
supra in note 62 but by certain states' own accountability workbooks. E.g. supra nn. 60-61 and
accompanying text.
71. ,)'ee Richard Rothstein, Class and Schools: Using Social, Economic, and Educational
RejiJrm to Close the Black-White Achievement Gap, 72-83 (Econ. Policy lnst. 2004).
72. See Erpenbach et a!., supra n. 30, at 34-35 ("Some States (e.g., Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Ohio, Wisconsin) have established higher minimum 'n's' for accountability determinations with
SWDs [students with disabilities] subgroups."); id. at 52 (noting that this strategy has a "long-term
impact on the number of schools and districts identified for improvement"). For statutory provisions
relevant to minimum subgroup sizes, see 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(C)(v)(ll)(dd), (b)(2)(1)(ii),
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has alreadl failed to make A YP "because its 10 special education
7
students" failed to test proficiently, while in the same year a Virginia
school made AYP "despite its 24 special education students' failing to
make A YP. The difference? The minimal group size for reporting was
74
five in Maryland and 50 in Virginia." As this example shows, disabled
students can easily cause an entire school to fail A YP because their test
results are counted separately. With so much riding on subgroups' test
performance, it is not surprising that states are exercising some strategic
discretion in determining minimum subgroup sizes.
Although subjective motives cannot be determined with certainty,
some states' actions seem problematic in the light of observable data. In
2004, for example, Washington State raised the minimum subgroup size
for disabled students and limited English proficiency speakers, but for no
75
As a result, any Washington
other subgroups, from thirty to forty.
school with thirty-nine or fewer disabled students will not separately be
held accountable for the test performance of these students. Oddly,
Washington waited until two years into the NCLB timeline to raise the
minimum size for only the disabled and limited English $peakers. New
Jersey acted identically with respect to the disabled by increasing its
minimum subgroup size for disabled students from twenty to thirty-five,
also in the year 2004. Had this increase been in place in 2003, it would
76
have dramatically cut the number of schools failing to make AYP. In
fact, one New Jersey newspaper estimates the number of such schools in
77
the hundreds.
If Washington and New Jersey were indeed
manipulating their minimum subgroup sizes, they arguably transgressed
the Act's commands.
In setting subgroup sizes, NCLB mandates that states consider only
whether a given size effectuates the collection of reliable information and
78
ensures student anonymity.
Outside of reliability or anonymity
(b)(3)(C)(xiii).
73. Gerald W. Bracey, The 14th Bracev Report on the Condition ofPublic L'ducation, 86 Phi
Delta Kappan, 149 (Oct. 2004).
74. !d.
75. David Wickert, WASL Tweaks Bring Standards within Reach: Scoring Changes: Schools
to Get lligher Marks. L'ven if Students Don't, Morn. News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.) A I (Oct. 21,
2004).
76. John Mooney, US L'ases Rules on Test Results
Star-Lcdger(Newark, N. J.)40(Junc 25, 2004).

./iJr Jersey's Special Fd Students, The

77. Maia Davis, US. Education Department Approves New Jersey·.,. Special Education Plan,
The Record (Bergen County, N.J.) A4 (June 24, 2004) ("An analysis by The Record (Bergen
County, NJ), published last month, found that hundreds of schools deemed underperforming last
year may now escape that label because they have fewer than thirty-tivc special education
studenb. ").
78. See 20 U.S.C.

~

63ll(b)(2)(C)(v)(ll)(dd), (b)(2)(1)(ii), (b)(3 )(C)(xiii).
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concerns, there is no obvious justification for setting a higher subgroup
size for the disabled and for limited English speakers than for racial
79
minorities or the poor. Washington's and New Jersey's alteration of
the minimum subgroup sizes only for the disabled and limited English
speakers seems consistent with a hypothesis of strategic manipulation.
In 2004, many states, including Alaska, Arkansas, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Washington obtained Education Department approval of
80
higher minimum subgroup sizes. By granting to states the ability to
raise minimum subgroup sizes-even in arguably suspicious cases like
those of Washington and New Jersey-the Education Department has
invited manipulation.

2. Confidence Intervals
81

To improve their NCLB statistics, a majority of states
have
implemented another evasion device-the use of confidence intervals82
which can dramatically increase a state's A YP numbers. To cite an
extreme example, one Utah newspaper claims that fifty-six percent of all
Utah schools that made A YP in 2004 did so by using a confidence
mterva.1 83
To understand confidence intervals, imagine a typical news poll
asking a sample group of randomly selected voters whom they will vote
for in an upcoming election. The various polls, even if conducted in the
same manner, will tend to disagree somewhat due to random variation in
4
the sample groups. s But almost all the time, a repeated poll will have
0

79. A state might permissibly show that special education students' scores have higher
variance and therefore a larger group of students is needed to make scores "reliable," if the state can
also show that the Act's usage of"reliable" calls for a certain level of variance in test scores. For the
argument that reliability may call for a certain level of variance in test scores, see generally Robert
L. Linn & Carolyn Haug, Stahility of School-Building Accountahilitv Scores and Gains, 24 Educ.
Evaluation & Policy Analysis 29 (2002).
80. See supra nn. 75--77 and accompanying text; Ctr. on Educ. Policy, Rule Changes Could
Help More Schools Meet Test Score Targets jiJr the No Child Lefi Behind Act 3-4, 9- 10,
http://www.ctrcdpol.org/nclb/StateAccountabilityPlanAmendmentsReportOct2004.pdf (Oct. 22,
2004 ). The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and some states appear interested in doing the same.
See Diana Jean Schcmo, States' End Run Dilutes BurdenjiJr Special Ed, N.Y. Times AI (June 7,
2004).
81. For an overview of confidence interval use as found in states' accountability workbooks,
see Erpenbach ct aL, supra n. 30, at 21-22. See also Ctr. on Educ. Policy, supra n. 80, at 3 ("About
half the states had already included the usc of confidence intervals in their original accountability
plans. Since then, 12 states have either introduced the usc of confidence intervals or changed the way
they plan to use them to determine A YP.").
82. See infi·a nn. 149-154 and accompanying text.
83. Jennifer Toomer-Cook, 114% of Utah Schools Make the Grade on A YP Reports, Descrct
Morning News (Salt Lake City, Utah) 87 (Dec. 7, 2004).
84. For this paragraph, sec Study Works Online, Polling: Margin of f:rror,
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results that fall within a range, called the margin of error. The margin of
85
error defines the confidence interval. For example, if fifty percent of
respondents in a poll say they will vote for Candidate A, and the margin
of error is eight percent, then the repeated poll will almost always
randomly register between fifty-eight and forty-two percent support for
Candidate A. Fifty-eight to forty-two percent is the confidence interval.
States are using this statistical technique to cushion their schools'
86
A YP results with a margin of error. A recent New York Times report
offered the following example of how a confidence interval may affect
A YP results in practice: A state opts for a confidence level that results in
87
a twenty-three percent margin of error for a small "sample" size of
88
thirty minority students. The potential effect of the confidence interval
"is significant, if seemingly technical: For a class of 30 minority students
at a school where 40 percent of each group must pass a given exam, the
[confidence interval] cushion grants the school victory if only 17 percent,
89
or 5 rather than 12 students, succeed."
Suppose in the above example that this hypothetical school's
subgroup achieves exactly seventeen percent proficiency (and fails
twenty-three percent short of the AMO of forty percent). The
justification for considering the school compliant is that its students'
inadequate scores were the result of random variation in the "sample" of
90
students. The state may claim that another "sample" of students from
91
the same population would have met the AMO. Failure, then, was not
the school's fault but the result of the random variation in the student

http :1/www .studyworkson Iinc.com/cda/content/artic le/0, EX P545 _N A V2-76_SA R542,00 .shtml
(accessed Feb. 23, 2006).
85. See gem·rally Mario F. Triola, Elementary Statistics 284-302 (6th ed., Addison-Wesley
Publg. Co. 1995).
86. For an overview of how confidence intervals in the A YP context work, see generally
ASR-CAS Jt. Study Group on Adequate Yearly Progress & Scott Marion et al., Making Valid and
Reliable Decisions in Determining Adequate Yearlv Progress 65-67 (Council of Chief St. Sch.
2002)
[hercinatler
Marion
et
al.]
(available
at
Officers
http://www .ccsso.org/contentlpdfs/ A YPpaper.pdt).
87. Quotes are put around the word "sample" because students are not samples in the NCLB
system. See infra n. 90 and accompanying text.
88. See Schcmo, supra n. 80.
89. !d.
90. Of course, students generally arc not randomly assigned to schools and so cannot be
considered a "random sample." Further. school populations within the Act's A YP framework are not
really "samples" either because every student (not a mere sample of students) is supposed to be
tested. See Schemo, supra n. 80 ("In addition, some statisticians ... question the validity of using
confidence intervals for this purpose. The cushions arc most otlen used to allow for variations in
statistical sampling, but schools are reporting on actual students. not samples of them." (emphasis
added)).
91. See generally Linn & Haug, supra n. 79, at 29-36.
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sample. If they rely on confidence intervals heavily enough, schools
using a confidence interval may never actually have to reach I 00 percent
student proficiency, because they can always subtract the margin of error
92
from 100 percent and be considered compliant. This use of confidence
intervals arguably compromises the Act's goals because the mandate of
NCLB-that every public school student will test proficiently by
93
2014 -is rendered unnecessa~. NCLB nowhere authorizes confidence
4
intervals or anything like them. Their use came about as a result of the
Education Department's <Erocess of reviewing and approving state
5
accountability workbooks.
In short, the Balloon Schedule clearly violates NCLB. The selection
of minimum subgroup sizes and the use of confidence intervals also
arguably violate the Act.
II. WHY HAVE STATES AND THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT ADOPTED
THE BALLOON SCHEDULE?

A. A Brief Overview ofNCLB 's Sanctions
States using the Balloon Schedule help their schools avoid NCLB's
severe sanctions for failing to make A YP. When a school falls short of
AYP for two consecutive years, the school district must identify it for
96
"school improvement." Students in such a school receive the option to
97
transfer to another school within the school district, with transportation
98
costs paid by the school district. With the technical assistance of the

92. See e.g Angela Pascopella, Did the Tail Wag Dog? (Inside the Law: Ana(vzing, Debating
and /Lrplaining No Child Leji Behind) 41 Dist. Admin. 123 (Jan. 2005).
93. See supra n. 2 and accompanying text.
94. See Marion et a!., supra n. R6, at 72 ("[T]hc law does not mention confidence intervals at
all."); E-mail from Terri Duggan Schwartzbeck, Policy Analyst, Am. Assn. of Sch. Adminstrs., to
the author (June 28, 2004) (copy on file with author).
95. See id.
96. 20 U.S. C. ~ 6316(b)( I )(A) ("[A] local educational agency shall identify for school
improvement any elementary school or secondary school served under this part that fails, for 2
consecutive years, to make adequate yearly progress as defined in the State's plan under section
63ll(b)(2) of this title.").
97. !d. at§ 6316(b)( I )(E)(i) ("In the case of a school identified for school improvement under
this paragraph, the local educational agency shall, not later than the first day of the school year
following such identification, provide all students enrolled in the school with the option to transfer to
another public school served by the local educational agency.").
98. !d. at§ 6316(b)(9) ("'n any case described in paragraph (I )(E) for schools described in
paragraphs (I )(A), (5), (7)(C)(i), and (8)(A). and subsection (c)( I O)(C)(vii) of this section, the local
educational agency shall provide, or shall pay for the provision of, transportation for the student to
the public school the student attends.").
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school district and after a possible review of the school's data,
the
failing school must develop and implement a two-year plan to
10
improve.
Failure to achieve A YP for three years triggers intensified
101
. .
.
sc hoo I d1stnct assistance.
If a school fails to meet A YP for a fourth consecutive year it may be
102
subject to "corrective action."
Such action "might include replacing
school personnel, instituting a new curriculum, extending the school
year, ... authorizing students to transfer to hifilher-performing schools[,]"
3
or a reduction in funding to the target school.
Finally, if "corrective action" does not cause the school to make
104
A YP after another full year,
the school becomes subject to
105
"restructuring."
The school district must pick an option from the law's
restructuring menu, including:

°

(I) Reopening the school as a public charter school;
(2) Replacing school staff"relevant" to the school's failure;
(3) Hiring a private company to run the school;
106
(4) Turning the school over to the state government to run.

The Act also contains a catchall phrase allowing the use of additional
107
types of restructuring that would be effective.
As a school passes from improvement to corrective action to
restructuring, the sanctions for failure to achieve A YP grow
108
"increasingly harsh."
It is not surprising that states would wish to help
their schools avoid these sanctions by any means available, including the
Balloon Schedule and other evasions of the Act.

99. !d. at § 6316(b)(2) ("Before identifying an elementary school or a secondary school for
school improvement under paragraphs (I) or (5)(A), for corrective action under paragraph (7), or for
restructuring under paragraph (8), the local educational agency shall provide the school with an
opportunity to review the school-level data, including academic assessment data, on which the
proposed identification is based.").
I 00.

!d. at § 6316(b )(3 ).

101. !d. at§ 6316(b)(5).
I 02.

!d. at § 6316(b )(7) (defining corrective action).

I 03. Cory Shindel, Student Author, One Standard Fits Alf? Defining Achievement Standards

for Students with Cognitive Disabilities within the No Child Le.fi Behind Act's Standardized
Framework, 12 J.L. & Policy 1025, 1044--45 (2004).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(A).
105. !d.
I 06.

!d. at§ 6316(b)(8)(13).

107. !d.
I 08.

Ryan, supra n. 25, at 933.
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B. NCLB 's Unrealistic Goals Pressure States to Adopt Evasion
Strategies

The true underlying problem may be that NCLB's timeline and
goals, though laudable in their intent, do not derive from sound research.
Nearly all education experts see NCLB's 100 percent ~roficiency goal
109
1
and its time line as unrealistic
or even malignant.
To reach full
proficiency by 2014, states must maintain significant proficiency growth
Ill
for up to twelve years,
but there appears to be no "state that's
112
sustained a growth of 5 percent a year over 5 years, let alone I 2."
Indeed, "a large number of independent scholars have demonstrated that
it is not ?Jossible to have 100 percent of students achieve a high
13
standard."
Studies simulating student performance based on past test results
also paint a glum picture. "With few exceptions, the State simulation
studies show that a high proportion of schools will likely not meet the
114
new A YP requirements within two or three school years."
Even if
states calculate A YP using statistical methods that eliminate smaller
schools from their accountability reports, "almost all schools will end
115
identified for improvement within five or six years."
Tellingly,
education scholar Abigail Thernstrom, a prominent Republican and a
116
George W. Bush appointee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,

I 09. See W. James Popham, Presentation, Ruminations Regarding NCLB 's Most Malignant
Provision: Adequate Year(v Progress 2, (D.C., July 28, 2004) (available at http://www.cepdc.org/pubs/Forum28July2004/RuminationsReNCLI3-A YP-ss-071488.pdf)
(referring
to "the
outlandish unrealism of the [NCLI3's] adequate yearly progress (A YP) provisions," and specifying
that "NCLB currently calls for schools to produce unrealistic increases in the test scores of
successive cohorts of students."); Marion et a!., supra n. 86, at 12 ("In a number of cases, the
proficient level has been set so high [by the state] that it may be completely unrealistic to expect all
students to reach that level by 20 14").
110. Popham, supra n. 109, at I (referring in the title to NCLB's adequate yearly progress
requirements as "[m]alignant"). SeeM. Hayes Mizell, From Muck to Mountaintop, 33 J.L. & Educ.
261, 261 (2004) ("A friend of mine who is a charter school administrator characterizes the law's
application and compliance provisions as 'draconian and bordering on the sadomasochistic.'").
Ill. See supra tbl. I.
112. Diana Jean Schema, Sidestepping of New School Standards [,, Seen, N.Y. Times A21
(Oct. 15, 2002).
113. William J. Mathis, No Child l.efi B!.'hind Act: What Will It Cost States:' 77 Spectrum: J. of
St. Govt. 8 (Apr. I, 2004 ). See Goldberg, supra n. 36 ("[T]he fact is that no large city, state, or
country~other than mythical Lake Wobegon--- has ever produced an entire population of students
who are above average.").
114. Marion et a!., supra n. 86, at 64.
115. !d. at 65.
116. See genera/tv Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Ahigail Thernstrom
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/thcrnstrom~a.htm (accessed Feb. 23, 2006) (providing
biographical data about Abigail Thcrnstrom).
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dismisses the suggestion that all students can achieve a "Proficient"
rating on her state's tests-or even a "Basic" rating on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a national proficiency
117
Th e 10rmer
c
.. .
test.
sh e cntlc1zes
as "I ud.1crous," th e 1atter as
118
"utopian."
So far, A YP statistics arc not encouraging. Of the nation's 91,400
public schools, approximately 26,000 (28.4 percent) failed to make A YP
119
in the school year ending in 2003.
Nearly all states set their AMOs
120
. 2003-at th e1r
. startmg
. pomts.
.
very 1ow m
One can only guess how quickly schools will fail to make A YP as
intermediate goals come due. One study predicts that by 2014, ninetynine rercent of California public schools will have failed to make
21
The Connecticut Education Association estimates that "[m ]ore
A YP.
than 90% of Connecticut elementary and middle schools won't meet
122
Researchers forecast that by
federal education standards in 10 years."
123
Relying
2014 "nearly all schools in all states will fail under the law."
on similar research and facts, education researcher William J. Mathis
voices doubt about NCLB's core premise that every child can succeed in
124
the sense contemplated by NCLB.
Even some NCLB supporters are
125
pessimistic about schools' chances for reaching full proficiency.
117. Abigail Thernstrom, Speech, Comments, in No Child Leji Behind: What Will it Take? 103,
http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/NCLBreport.pdf (Feb. 2002). For an overview of the National
Assessment of Educational Progress, see Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Overview: What is NAEP?
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about (updated Nov. 25, 2005).
118. Thernstrom, supra n. 117.
119. See Goldberg, supra n. 36 ("Approximately 26,000 of the nation's 91,400 public schools
failed to make A YP in the 2002-03 school year.").
120. See supra tbl. I.
121. Bracey, supra n. 73, at 139 ("[T]he projection is for 99'1<• failure by the witching year of
2014, when I 00% of students must be 'proficient'.").
122. Associated Press, Study: 9 Out of" 10 Schools Won't Meet Federal Standards in a Decade,
Hartford Courant I (May 28, 2004).
123. Diana Jean Schemo, "f/iirl by Bush on Education flits Obstacles, N.Y. Times AI (Aug.
18, 2004). See also Robert L. Linn, Presentation, Rethinking the No Child Leji Behind Accountability
s:vstem 3 (D.C., July 28, 2004) (available at http://www.cep-dc.org/pubs/Forum28July2004)
("[A]lmost all schools will fall short of the adequate yearly progress (A YP) targets within the next
few years, unless major changes are made in the definition of A YP.").
124. See Mathis, supra n. I 13.
125. See e.g. Michael D. Casserly, Speech, Comments, in No Child Leji Behind: What Will it
Take? 71, http://www.edexcellencc.net/doc/NCLBreport.pdf (Feb. 2002) ("Finally, [NCLB] has a
strong accountability system that we also backed .... We expect to have a great deal of difficulty
executing the bill's A YP provisions. . . [O]ur biggest challenge will be getting our instructional
programs to do what this legislation envisions."). The pro-NCLB Education Trust, an advocacy
group, released a study in 2004 that emphasized progress in narrowing racial achievement gaps but
admitted that "the pace of progress was generally insutlicient to reach the goal of full proficiency by
2014." Michael Dobbs, Kerry Competes to Claim Issue of"RejiJrm, Wash. Post A4 (Oct. 20, 2004)
(summarizing findings from this study). See Educ. Trust, Measured Progress: Achievement Rises
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Former Education Secretary Rod Paige, however, has dismissed such
criticisms and tried to rebut them with positive anecdotes about a few
126
schools that have experienced notable success.
The impossibility of complying with NCLB on the merits, combined
with the harshness of its sanctions, generates the pressure motivating
states to help their schools evade the Act.
C. The Functions ofthe Balloon Schedule and Other Devices

The Balloon Schedule helps states evade NCLB in two ways. First,
backloading artificially lowers states' AMOs during the first half of the
127
Act's timeline.
For exam~le, if Georgia had applied South Carolina's
1 8
intermediate goal structure
of even progress over the Act's timeline,
Georgia would have scheduled a twenty percent increase in middle
school reading proficiency by 2008, rather than a thirteen percent
increase. (The Balloon Schedule thus gives Georgia middle schools a
129
seven percent cushion. ) Due to this cushion, Georgia's middle schools
with reading proficienc~ increases between thirteen percent and twenty
1 0
percent will artificially
achieve A YP in reading in 2008.
Second, if states utilize a Balloon Schedule or similar tactics, they
have less of an incentive to adopt other evasion strategies. For instance,
the cushion Georgia schools gain by using the Balloon Schedule reduces
pressure to further embellish student proficiency.

D. The Federal Government's Interest in Approving the Balloon
Schedule
The Balloon Schedule and the other evasion strategies inflate the
number of schools making A YP, creating the appearance of school
improvement and NCLB success, for which the federal government
(especially the Education Department) may take credit. President George
W. Bush and former Education Secretary Rod Paige both lauded
NCLB's supposed "success" during the 2004 presidential election

and
Gaps
Narrow,
but
Too
Slowly
1-8,
http://www2 .edtrust.org/edtrust/images/MeasurcdProgress.doc .pdf (Oct. 2004).
126. See e.g. Rod Paige, Speech, Remarks of' Secretarv Paige '1!,1 24-26 (The Educ. Writers
Assoc. 2002 Annual Seminar, Apr. 27, 2002) (available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/2002/
04/20020427.html).
127. Such inflation is "artificial" to the extent that something other than genuine student
improvement causes it, and such improvement is over and above what the state would accomplish
while complying with the Act (i.e., by not using a Balloon Schedule).
128. See supra tbl. I.
129. The seven percent cushion is relative to a stair-step intermediate goal structure.
130. On the meaning of"artificial" as used here, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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For example, former Secretary Paige's address at the 2004
season.
Republican National Convention urged voters to reelect President Bush
on the basis ofNCLB's proven results: "Ladies and gentlemen, No Child
Left Behind is working .... Only one candidate has created an education
132
This
system worthy of a great nation: President George W. Bush."
logic, however, cuts in both directions. Without ostensible successes in
education, NCLB will look like a failure, and the federal government
will absorb the blame. The Balloon Schedule and other evasion devices
133
help ensure that NCLB redounds to the government's credit.
President Bush and former Education Secretary Rod Paige have
taken much credit for ostensible improvement in schools since the Act's
134
passage.
Bush Administration officials t(fsically have claimed success
5
by saying that test scores have gone up.
Both President Bush and
former Secretary Paige point to improved math scores of fourth- and
136
eighth-graders from 2000 to 2003 on a nationwide proficiency test,
137
the NAEP.
Similarly, Paige's successor, Secretary Margaret
Spellings, attributed gains in reading on the NAEP among nine-year-olds
"138
between I 999 and 2004 to NCLB.
On the other hand, there was no

131. See e.g. George W. Bush, Speech, Remarks hy the President at Victmy 201)4 Rally
(Oshkosh, Wis., Oct. 15, 2004), in White House Press Releases and Documents (available at 2004
WL 2558203) [hereinafter Bush, Remarks at Viet my Rally] ("The No Child Left Behind Act is
working."); Erik W. Robe len, Paige: It's Not Too lo'arly to Call School Law a Success, 24 Educ.
Week 23 (Oct. 6, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 63594841) ("Rod Paige is declaring the No Child
Left Behind Act a success.").
132. Rod Paige, Speech, Remarks hy Education Secretary Rod Paige~~ 20, 27 (Republican
National Convention, Aug. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Paige, Republican National Convention] (available
at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A50460-2004Aug31.html).
133. C{: Anne C. Lewis, States Feel the Crunch of' NCLB, 86 Phi Delta Kappan 339 (Jan.
2005).
134. See infra nn. 131-158, and accompanying text.
135. See George W. Bush, Speech, President's Remarks in New Mexico,[ 40 (Alamogordo,
N.M., Oct. 24, 2004), in White House Press Releases & Documents (available at 2004 WLNR
3336295) ("We passed the No Child Left Behind Act, which is bringing high standards to our
classrooms .... We're seeing great progress across this country. Math and reading scores are on the
rise."); Paige, Republican National Convention, supra n. 132, at~~ 20-21 ("No Child Left Behind is
working .... All across America, test scores are rising; students arc learning; the achievement gap is
closing."). See also Bush, Remark\· at Victory Rallv, supra n. 131.
136. Bush, The Essential Work ofDemocracv, supra n. 26; Rod Paige, Speech, Paige Kicks OfT
Annual Celebration oj'Historically Black Colleges and Universities~ 18 (Sept. 13, 2004) (available
at http://www.ed.gov/ncws/speeches/2004/09109132004.html).
137. Recall that NAEP stands for "National Assessment of Educational Progress." See supra n.
117.
138. See U.S. Dept. Educ., Spellings Hails New National Report Card Results, http://www
.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2005/07/07142005.html (July 14, 2005) ("Today's Report Card is proof
that No Child Left Behind is working-it is helping to raise the achievement of young students of
every race and from every type of family background. . . More than half of the progress in reading
for 9-year olds during the Report Card's entire history has been made in the last five years. It is not a
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statistically significant improvement in the average scaled NAEP reading
scores of thirteen-year-o1ds and seventeen-year-olds over the same
139
period (1999-2004).
Since NCLB's definition of A YP pivots not on
140
141
but on state tests,
it is unclear whether NAEP
the NAEP
proficiency gains are related to the Act. Nonetheless, any increases in
NAEP scores are a good thing and may be at least partially attributable to
implementation of the Act.
In other claims of success, the federal government has sought to take
142
credit for some states' artificially
inflated progress. "Federal officials
brag about the reduction in the number of schools failing to make
adequate yearly progress (A YP) in 2004 in most states, forgetting to
mention that changes in regulations are more responsible for the assumed
improvement than any increase in the capacity of states and schools to
14
significantly improve student leaming."
As the 2004 presidential election season grew more intense, the
White House issued a detailed September press release publicizing
144
NCLB's supposed successes.
Some of these claimed successes have
145
undoubtedly been inflated by state evasion strategies.
For example,
the press release noted that in Maryland the "percentage of AfricanAmerican third graders scoring in the proficient range on state tests in
reading increased 16 points in one year,a" and noted similar progress for
1 6
President Bush similarly
Maryland's Hispanic fifth-graders.
147
highlighted these figures.
Maryland, however, made its tests easier to
coincidence that progress accelerated so dramatically during this time period.").
139. See Nat!. Ctr. Educ. Statistics, National Trends in Reading hy Average Scale Scores,
http:!/ nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ltt/results2004/nat-reading-scalcscore.asp (last updated July 6,
2005). ("Thirteen-year-olds. The average score in 2004 was higher than the average score in 1971,
but no difference from the average score in 1999 was found.") ("Scventeen-ycar-olds. There was no
statistically significant difference between average scores in 1999 and 2004").
140. See Linn, supra n. 123 ("[T]he use of state-level NAEP results arc not specified in the
law .... ").
141. The President and former Secretary Paige also do not claim that this progress was fast
enough to result in full proficiency by 2014. In fact, this progress is much too slow.
142. On the meaning of"artificial" as used here, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
143. Lewis, supra n. 133.
George
W.
Bush,
Education:
The
Promise of' America,
144. See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/rcleascs/2004/09/20040926.htm1#3 (Sept. 26, 2004 ).

~

3,

145. See supra n. 143 and accompanying text; infi·a nn. 148--158 and accompanying text.
Perhaps some of these supposed successes present some genuine student improvement, and the Act
may have facilitated some gains. Nevertheless, some of these supposed signs of success are artificial.
146. See supra n. 144.
147. See Bush, The Essential Work of' Democracy, supra n. 26 ("In Maryland, the percentage
of African American third-graders who are reading proficiently increased 16 percentage points in
one year. The percentage of Hispanic fifth-graders achieving proficiency in math increased nearly I 0
percentage points. And 25 schools exited school improvement status this year after meeting their
performance objectives.").
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148

pass for 2004,
and thus some of Maryland's improvement should be
attributed to its easier tests.
The White House press release similarly pointed to North Carolina's
increase in the percentage of schools achievin~ A YP, from forty-seven
14
percent in 2003 to seventy percent in 2004.
At least some of these
gains, however, derive from North Carolina's use of a confidence
interval to calculate A YP. If North Carolina had used its confidence
interval to calculate A YP in 2003, "about 200 more schools would have
hit the [A YP] mark, raising the state's success rate from 47 percent to 57
150
percent."
The statistical legerdemain for 2004 has turned out to be
stunningly higher than fifty-seven percent; a startlingly high seventy
percent of North Carolina's schools achieved A YP, partially due to its
151
use of a confidence interval.
The press release also cites similar improvement in 2004 in
Pennsylvania, a state that, like North Carolina, adopted a confidence
152
interval in 2004.
Pennsylvania saw a nineteen percent increase in the
proportion of schools making AYP in 2004 (from sixty-two to eighty-one
.
.
.
percent). 153 B ut sixteen
percent o f th.IS mneteen
percent Im~rovement
14
occurred "because of the addition of a confidence interval."
In other
words, eighty-four percent of increase in the proportion of Pennsylvania
schools that made A YP in 2004 derived from the use of a confidence
interval to calculate A YP. Pennsylvania has also adopted a Balloon
156
155
Schedule
which artificially
lowers its early AMOs. The .press
15
release points to the A YP-related progress of eight other states.
But
half of them (California, Delaware, Georgia, and Wisconsin) adopted the
158
Balloon Schedule and therefore currently have artificially low goals.
148. See infra nn. 187-188 and accompanying text (observing that Maryland's 2004 test scores
may show illusory gains in proficiency because the state lowered its testing standards).
149. See supra n. 144.
I 50. Ann Doss Helms, Many More Schools Expected to Meet Goals; But Those That Fail Must
Let Students Tran.\fcr Out, Charlotte Observer I B (July 19, 2004).
I 5 I See Emily S. Achenbaum, Union County Schools Show Improvement, Charlotte Observer
6U (July 22, 2004); Lynn Olson, Data Show Schools Making Progress on Federal Goals, 24 Educ.
Week (Sept. 8, 2004) ("In North Carolina, 70 percent of schools met all federal AYP goals in 200304, up from 47 percent in 2002-03. That difference can be traced in part to the federal government's
giving the state permission to use a 'confidence interval' . . .").
Pa.
Dept.
Educ.,
Adequate
Yearly
Progress
20113-114
Changes,
152. See
http://www.pde.state.pa .us/pas/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=104800 (accessed Feb. 13, 2005).
I 53. See Olson, supra n. 151.
!54. /d. (quoting state director for assessment and accountability Carina Wong).
155. See supra tbl. I.
I 56. On the meaning of"artificial" as used here, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
I 57. See supra n. 144.
I 58. See supra table I for the AMO schedules of California, Delaware, Georgia, and
Wisconsin. West Virginia's 2003 Accountability Workbook lacked sufficient information to
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Although the Education Department has of necessity been modest in
what it claims as success, taking even this kind of credit will be
159
precarious when a larger share of schools fails to make A YP.
The
federal government's interest in evasion strategies can be expected to
grow stronger in the future when intermediate goals come due and
further embellishment of A YP results is needed to prove that NCLB is
"working."
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE BALLOON SCHEDULE

A. NCLB Gives States the Right to Define Proficiency Down
NCLB's approach to state educational standards is out of tune with
the rest of the Act. When it comes to the twelve-year timeline, the I 00
percent proficiency goal, and its sanctions, the Act is rule-like. But
regarding the substance of state educational standards, the Act imposes
160
few or no constraints.
Noted education law expert Professor James E.
161
Ryan has called this inconsistency "regulatory stringency and laxity,"
and has observed that it "could well prove disastrous. It will encourage
states to lower their standards, make their tests easier, or lower the scores
162
needed to be deemed proficient."
NCLB includes two sets of educational standards: content standards
and performance standards. "Content standards define the skills and
knowledge that all students are expected to obtain and be able to
demonstrate while performance standards define proficiency levels for
163
skills and knowledge."
NCLB gives states the right to change, at any
164
time, either or both sets of standards.
"Nothing in this part," says the
Act, "shall prohibit a State from revising, consistent with this section,
categorize its AMO schedule as either a Balloon Schedule or not.
159. Sec supra sec. 11.8 (noting that most schools will eventually fail to make A YP).
160. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)( I )(D) (providing that "Standards under this paragraph shall
include-- -(i) challenging academic content standards in academic subjects that--(1) specify what
children are expected to know and be able to do; (II) contain coherent and rigorous content; and (Ill)
encourage the teaching of advanced skills; and (ii) challenging student academic achievement
standards that-(1) are aligned with the State's academic content standards; (II) describe two levels
of high achievement (proficient and advanced) that determine how well children are mastering the
material in the State academic content standards; and (Ill) describe a third level of achievement
(basic) to provide complete information about the progress of the lower-achieving children toward
mastering the proficient and advanced levels of achievement"). This provision in the Act in no way
limits states' authority to change or set their standards as they see fit.

161. Ryan, supra n. 25, at 944.
162. !d.

163. See Duran. supra n. 25, at 81.
See 20 U.S.C. ll63 l l(b)( I )(A)-(0).

164.
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165

any" educational standard relevant to NCLB.
The Act makes it illegal
for the Education DeFartment to require states to even submit their
16
standards for review.
If the Education Department wishes to prevent states from evading
NCLB by defining proficiency down, it may not do so by diktat. Instead,
the Department must induce states to voluntarily refrain from defining
proficiency down-by allowing more effective and more benign
evasions such as the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum subgroup
sizes, and the use of confidence intervals when determining AYP.
B. E.ffects of Defining Proficiency Down

Unlike lowering educational standards, the Balloon Schedule,
selection of minimum subgroup sizes, and confidence intervals have no
obvious effect on educational standards. These three evasions have been
167
As a result,
created for the sake of NCLB's accountability system.
they mainly manipulate A YP numbers that appear on federal
accountability reports.
Defining proficiency down, on the other hand, is com~arable to
68
grade inflation and directly lowers educational standards.
Grade
inflation occurs when average 9rades rise without a commensurate
69
increase in student performance.
Defining proficiency down does
exactly this: it increases the reward for the same level of performance by
170
lowering the educational standard.

165. ld at ~ 6311 (b)(l )(F) ("Nothing in this part shall prohibit a State from revising, consistent
with this section, any standard adopted under this part before or after January 8, 2002.").
166. ld at § 6311(b)(l)(A) (providing that "a State shall not be required to submit such
[academic content] standards to the [Education) Secretary").
167. All of these devices are created by provisions in the Act. See supra sees. l.D~l.F.
168. See infra n. 169 and accompanying text.
169. See Robert Birnbaum, Factors Related to University Grade Inflation, 48 J. Higher Educ.
519, 522 (1977) ("In the context of grades, inflation can be viewed as a process in which a defined
level of academic achievement results in a higher grade than awarded to that level of achievement in
the past. In plain language, grade inflation implies that it is now 'easier' to get a high grade in a
course than previously."); Perry A. Zirkel, Grade Inflation: Leadership Opportunity jiJr Schools of
Education'!, 101 Teachers College Rec. 247, 247 (1999) ("Grade inflation ... is a rise in academic
grades not accompanied by a commensurate increase in academic achievement.").
170. It is worth noting that grade inflation does not always cause standards to drop-if grade
expectations rise at the same rate that average grades do. Instead of educational standards dropping
in such a case, the symbols representing the standards (and thus the exact same expectations) would
merely shift upward. For example, if a college's average grade level rose from "C" to "B,"
employers' expectations for graduates' grades might also rise from "C" to "B." The symbols
representing the grades would have shifted upward, but employers' rising expectations would leave
the standard unchanged. Some employers and graduate schools today expect to see "high and
relatively undifferentiated grades, and therefore rely on other criteria." Henry Rosovsky & Matthew
Hartley, Evaluation and the Academy: Are We Doing the Right Thing? Grade Inflation and Letters
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When schools lower standards, they discourage higher levels of
171
student learning.
The predictable result of definin~ proficiency down
1
will be that students learn less and perform worse.
"[W]hen schools
through inflated grades promote lowered standards ... students routinely
173
perform far below their capability, and they know it."
Students "who
are rewarded regardless of their performance eventually lose respect for
174
their teachers and for the subject."
Colorado may be a case in point.
Since it defined proficiency down, Colorado's fourth-grade reading
175
176
scores on the NAEP
have dropped.
The Act's proponents understand this point well. According to the
Education Trust, an advocacy group that supports NCLB, setting
standards too low "ultimately stunt[s] the academic growth of our young
177
President Bush has said of NCLB: "We're challenging what
people."
I call the soft bigotry of low expectations. In other words, if you believe
certain children can't learn, they won't. It's just as simple as that. If
178
you've got low expectations ... you'll achieve mediocre results."
Fonner Education Secretary Rod Paige has similarly stated: "If
expectations are high, then students will thrive. If expectations are low,
then they will come to believe they are hopeless causes and they will
179
One education researcher has even opined that the Act
surrender"."

of Recommendation 12 (Acad. of Arts & Sciences, 2002). Of course. defining proficiency down for
purposes of NCLB cannot tit into this relatively benign category of grade inflation because the
"proficient" label's value is fixed by law. Expectations cannot rise to match lowering standards
unless NCLB is amended somehow. To be sure, states would want to define proficiency down only
if it lowered standards, or doing so would not help evade NCLI3.
171. See William Cole, The Perils of Grade Inflation, Chron. Higher Educ. Bl (Jan. 6, 1993)
("[B]y rewarding mediocrity, we discourage excellence.").
172. See Clifford H. Edwards, Grade Inflation: Till! lojfi!Cts on Educational Qua/ill' and
Personal Well-Being, 120 Educ. 538 (Spring 2000) ("Grade inflation generally promotes lower
academic standards and gives students a distorted view of their academic achievements and
abilities." (citations omitted)).
173. !d.
174. Gregory Stanley & Lawrence Baines, No More Shopping .fiJr Grades at B-Mart: Reestablishing Grades as Indicators of Academic PerjiH·mance, 74 Clearing House 227, 22S (Mar.
2001).
175. See supra nn. 117, 137 and accompanying text (discussing the NAEP).
176. Susan Saulny, State to State: Varied Ideas of 'Proficient·, N.Y. Times 13X (Jan. 19, 2005)
("Colorado's proficiency rate fell to 37 percent on the national test, but that score was high enough
to rank fifth in the nation."). Of course, this fact alone does not prove that Colorado's lowering of
standards caused the entire drop, but the drop is consistent with the theory that defining proficiency
down lowers student achievement.
177. Educ. Trust, Stalled in Secondary: A Look at Student Achi<'V<'tnent Since the No Child Leji
Behind Act 2, http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/77670E50-18RF-4AA8-8729-555115389E 18/0/
StalledlnSecondary.pdf (accessed Jan. 23, 2005).
178. Bush, Remarks, supra n. 27.
179. Matthews, supra n. 2 7.
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might never have been needed but for rampant grade inflation.

185
180

C. Banning the Balloon Schedule Would Encourage States to Define
Proficiency Down
If the Balloon Schedule and its cousins were banned, states would be
encour'}fled to inflate their proficiency results by defining proficiency
1
The "pressures to comply" with NCLB have already caused
down.
some states to "ease their standards for what it means to be 'proficient' in
182
For example, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana,
reading and math."
Maryland, Texas, Utah, and Washington have made it easier for their
183
students to test proficiently.
A Utah school curriculum director has
said that she cannot be sure how much of her school's statistical
184
improvement in 2004 derived from the state's lower "cut" scores.
Washington State estimates that four to nine percent more of its seventhgraders will test proficiently in reading and math in the coming year, as a
185
result of a lower "cut" score on its test.
An assistant superintendent
candidly remarked of this change: "The results are going to look like they
186
Maryland also "set easier passing standards [for its
have improved."
tests] so that double the percentage of students were deemed 'proficient'
187
under the new state tests than were deemed so under the old tests."
According to one editorial writer's assessment of Maryland's higher
scores in 2004, '"improvements' in test scores may be largely an

180. See John Stone, Lmving Children Behind; Grade Inflation a Growing Problem, Wash.
Times A 19 (Aug. 31, 2004).
181. See Marion et al., supra n. 86, at 13; Sam Dillon, Playing the Standards Game, N.Y.
Times 2 (May 25, 2003); Sam Dillon, States !Ire Relaxing Education Standards to Avoid Sanctions
from Federal Law, N.Y. Times A29 (May 22, 2003); David J. Hoff, States Revise the Meaning ol
'Proficient', Educ. Week, I (Oct. 9, 2002); Erpcnbach eta!., supra n. 30, at 7; No Child Act Leaves
Many in Perplexity, Lincoln J. Star (Lincoln, Ncb.) (Dec. 3, 2003), (available at
http:!/www.journalstar.com/ articles/2003/12/03/cditorial,_main_ljs/ I 0041623.txt) (quoting former
U.S. Education Secretary Rod Paige: "Unfortunately, some states have lowered the bar of
expectations to hide the performance of their schools."); Gary W. Ritter & Christopher J. Lucas,
Puzzled States, 3 Educ. Next 54, 60 (2003). See Matthew H. Joseph, ... And in Marvland, Wash.
Post B8 (Aug. I, 2004); Linda Shaw, Panel Lowers BarfiJr Passing Parts of WASL, Seattle Times
82 (May I I, 2004 ).
182. Marion eta!., supra n. 86, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. See Joseph, supra n. 181 (Maryland); Ronnie Lynn, 2 Jordan Schools Fail Feds' Test;
District Must Pay to Transport Students Who Transfi:r, Salt Lake Trib. C I (Nov. I, 2004); Ryan,
supra n. 25, at 947-48; David Wickert, WASL Tweaks Bring Standards within Reach; Scoring
Changes: Schools to Get Hi!',her Marks, Fven if Students Don't, Morn. News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.)
AI (Oct. 21, 2004).
184. Lynn, supra n. 183.
185. Wickert, supra n. 183.
186. !d (emphasis added).
187. Joseph, supra n. I 81.
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,188
uston.
The states that have lowered their standards are relatively few in
189
number-seven, to be exact.
Due to the Education Department's
approval of so many effective methods for inflating A YP numbers, states
apparently do not feel a great need to lower their standards so far.
The relatively low number of states defining proficiency may also be
partially due to the Act's requirement that some students from every state
take the NAEP. The Act provides that each state's accountability
workbook must contain assurances that, by the 2002-2003 school year, it
will "participate in biennial State academic assessments of 4th and 8th
190
Popularly known
grade reading and mathematics under" the NAEP.
as "the Nation's Report Card" and administered by a sub-unit of the U.S.
Department of Education, the NAEP is the "the only nationally
representative and continuing assessment of what America's students
191
know and can do in various subject areas."
The NAEP may help encourage states to keep standards high in the
following manner: if they lower their standards, states may experience a
192
leading to embarrassment
drop in their students' NAEP performance,
and perhaps public criticism of whatever leaders lowered the standards.
Such consequences appear to be the only incentives supplied by the Act's
193
NAEP requirement, because A YP does not account for NAEP scores.
Improvements or drops in NAEP scores alone-holding all other
194
variables constant-would have no effect on any school's A YP status.
Thus, while it must be acknowledged that the NAEP does provide some
incentive, however small, to keep standards high, the Act's
accountability system pulls strongly in the opposite direction-and
successfully, if the examples of the seven states that have lowered
1

188. !d.
189. These states are: Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Maryland. See supra n. 183 and accompanying text. It should be noted that M is so uri seems to be
planning to lower its testing "cut" scores sometime in 2006. See Ltr. from Thomas R. Davis, Pres.,
Mo. Dept. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., to all Missouri Educators, (Feb. 18, 2004) (available
at http://www.dese.state.mo.us/stateboard/letters/2004/02182004.html) ("The stated goal of NCLB is
for all children to be proficient in reading and math by 2014. However, the annual testing that is
required to measure our progress toward that goal will not be available until 2006. At that time all of
Missouri's definitions (such as 'proficiency') will have to be redone to create new cut scores on the
annual tests."). The Missouri Board of Education initially declined to lower "cut" scores. See Deann
Smith, State School Board Maintains Current Testing Standards, Kansas City Star (Apr. 17, 2003)
(available at http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/local/5649270.htm? I c).
190. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(2).
191. Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra n. 117.
192. For one possible example of this, see e.g. supra n. 176 and accompanying text.
193. The Act nowhere incorporates the NAEP into its definition of A YP. See 20 U.S.C.
6311 (2)(b)( 1)(BHC) (setting forth the definition of"adequate yearly progress").
194. See id.
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195 I d d
.
. d.IcattOn.
stan d ard s are any m
n ee , as pressure .c.trom t he Act ' s
accountability system builds, it is easy to imagine states preferring some
shame and embarrassment from lower NAEP scores to rising numbers of
schools being subject to improvement, corrective action, and
•
1"96
restructurmg.
Rather than lower education standards, states have thus far much
preferred to employ the evasion devices blessed by the Education
Department: the Balloon Schedule, selection of minimum subgroup
sizes, and confidence intervals. Recall that twenty-two states opted for
197
the Balloon Schedule in their 2003 accountability workbooks.
A
198
majority of states use a confidence interval.
Over a dozen states have
arguably manipulated minimum subgroup sizes, with more considering
199
this tactic.
But only two of the states that have lowered educational
00
standards (Louisiana and Texas) also use the Balloon Schedule? It is
also telling that, of the thirteen states whose governors announced in
early 2005 their plans to raise educational standards, ten (seventy-seven
201
percent) are Balloon Schedule states.
In all, about half of all states are
202
Balloon Schedule states.
The pressure to define proficiency down, if these other strategies
were eliminated, could be enormous. For schools in Balloon Schedule
states, AMOs would immediately jump if the Balloon Schedule were
banned. Witness Georgia, a state where middle school reading AMOs for
2006 could soar above currently prescribed levels by as much as seven
203
percent.
In North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and other states, confidence
204
intervals have aided hundreds of schools in making A YP.
Likewise,
without selection of subgroup sizes many schools would fail to make

195. Sec supra n. 189 and accompanying text.
196. For an overview of sanctions such as school improvement, corrective action, and
restructuring, see supra section II. A.
197. See supra tbl. I.
198. See supra n. 81 and accompanying text.
199. See supra n. 72 and accompanying text.
200. See supra tbl. 1.
201. Robert Pear, Uovernors o( 13 States Plan to Raise Standards in High Schools. N.Y. Times
A 13 (Feb. 28, 2005) ("The 13 states arc Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts. Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Texas. Other
states are expected to join the coalition in the next few weeks.") Of these, only Arkansas, Kentucky.
and Massachusetts arc not Balloon Schedule states. See supra tbl. I. The lists of states cited so fi1r
stand out as bizarre in this respect: two of the states whose govcmors are now calling tor higher
standards (Louisiana and Texas) are Balloon Schedule states and have already lowered their
standards.
202. See supra tbl. 1.
203. See supra n. 129 and accompanying text.
204. Sei' supra nn. 150-154 and accompanying text.
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A YP due to their special education students.
Any crackdown on these
strategies would likely contribute to an increase in the number of states
lowering educational standards beyond its currently modest number of
206
seven.
CONCLUSION

In an effort to save the No Child Left Behind Act from its own
unrealistic requirements, the Education Department has allowed states to
heavily backload planned student proficiency gains, to change minimum
subgroup sizes in ways that exclude disadvantaged students from
accountability reports, and to use confidence intervals to calculate A YP.
Although allowing these evasions may violate the Act, their use is
arguably the right thing to do because it reduces the incentive for states
to do something even worse: harmfully define educational proficiency
down.

205. See e.g. Karen Hill, Making the Grade: Special Education: Acceptah/e Score 1/inges on
Progress of Disabled If Too Few Pass. Whole School Fails, Atlanta J. Const. 06 (Aug. I, 2004)
("Although failure in any one of 14 subgroups would flunk an entire school, it is the 'disabled'
subgroup that shoved many schools in metro Atlanta off the list.").
206. See Ryan, supra n. 25, at 114-·16 (observing that states have four options for avoiding
failure under NCLB: (I) raise proficiency to I 00 percent on the merits; (2) use an evasion strategy,
such as the Balloon Schedule: (3) opt-out of Title I funds: and (4) lower educational standards).

